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This study models the behavior of a government that faces the problem of 
redistributing a common revenue pool efficiently and equitably.  We specifically consider 
such a rule that takes into account both local governments’ tax collection effort and the 
deviation of local incomes from their targets.  By comparatively analyzing alternative fiscal 
procedures led by the central and local governments, the model suggests that, given the 
proposed redistributive mechanism, fiscal decentralization plays a disciplinary role.   
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1. Introduction     
 
Fiscal decentralization (FD) is viewed as an institutional mechanism defined by the 
leading status of the local governments over the central government in taking fiscal decisions 
and/or actions.  This paper develops a model to address the relationship between FD and 
fiscal discipline, which we consider to be a public good that the government needs to deliver.  
We consider two aspects of fiscal discipline: the aggregate tax collection effort and the size of 
redistribution.  The latter is a relevant aspect of fiscal discipline, since, though not explicitly 
addressed in the current version of the paper, it has implications for deficit financing and thus 
macroeconomic stability.   
In many countries, local governments mainly depend on the transfers received from 
the central government for their fiscal activity.  The need for transfers arises due to both 
vertical and horizontal imbalances.  Vertical imbalances that result from the greater capacity 
of central governments in collecting revenues than local government are common.
3  So are 
horizontal imbalances that result from the varying fiscal capacities across the different regions 
of a country.   
Besides the existence of such imbalances between the central and local governments 
and across the local governments, the reason for local governments’ reliance on the central 
government can be related with the local ability of, or effort spent for, collecting taxes.  As 
                                                 
3 Though especially many developed countries often have less vertical imbalances due to federal 
systems (nonetheless, in Canada, Switzerland, US and Germany, for example, central government 
transfers still constitute 50% to 70% of local government budgets), developing countries have often 
much higher vertical imbalances (while local governments in some Latin American countries rely on 
the central government for between 70% to 80% of their revenues, in countries like Peru, Portugal and 
Iran this ratio has been more than 90%).  (see Neyapti, 2005).  
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both fiscal imbalances and income inequality have significant welfare implications, it would 
be desirable that the design of a redistributive mechanism bears the characteristics of 
disciplining governments while eliminating horizontal imbalances.
4  This study employs such 
a redistributive mechanism in order to address the role of FD on fiscal discipline, which has 
not yet been addressed in the literature.
5  
The motivation for this study emerges from an overview of empirical studies on the 
macroeconomic implications of FD.  While there is a growing literature on the socio-
economic consequences of FD
6, which however provides mixed evidence on the merits of FD,
 
only a few studies have looked at the macroeconomic consequences of FD.
7  Among them, 
Neyapti (2005a) provides a cross-section study that demonstrates that FD reduces budget 
deficits mainly in cases of large population size and good governance.   In addition, Neyapti 
(2004) shows that revenue decentralization is associated with lower inflation in the presence 
of high central bank independence and local accountability, indicating that FD can be 
considered as a fiscal disciplining device.  Neyapti (2006) shows that revenue decentralization 
                                                 
4 Although equality across regions is desirable from the perspective of a benevolent planner, it has its 
costs in terms of either depriving the relatively wealthier regions from investments that would have 
otherwise yielded positive spill-over effects in the long-run, or for those in favor of status-quo, or 
simply in the form of transactions costs.  Nonetheless, this paper simply focuses on the benefits of 
equalization.   
5 Ma (1997) reports the characteristics of four classifications of fiscal transfer systems.  In some 
countries (for example, in Australia, Germany, Japan, Korea and United Kingdom), transfers are made 
on the basis of both equalization of fiscal capacities and expenditure needs across regions.  The second 
method only considers equalization of fiscal capacities (for example, in Canada), assuming the same 
expenditure need across the regions. The third transfer method only considers equalizing expenditure 
needs, measured by a weighted average of various socio-economic and demographic indicators (for 
example, in India, Italy and Spain).  A final classification of fiscal transfer methods entails the 
equalization of transfers only on the per capita basis (for example,  Turkey and, with regards to certain 
types of transfers also Germany, Canada, England and India).  The first method is the most advanced 
one in that it addresses both vertical and horizontal inequalities in the most effective way.  In terms of 
data requirements, however, it is also the most demanding one.   
6 Among them are: Bradhan and Mookherjee (1998), Panizza (1999), Barrett (2000), Blanchard and 
Shleifer (2000), Dethier (2000), Lin and Liu (2000), Norris et al. (2000), de Mello (2000a and 2000b),  
Tanzi (2000), Treisman (2000), Von Braun and Grote (2000), Eaton (2001), Wasylenko (2001), de 
Mello and Barenstein (2001), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Feltenstein and Iwata (2002) and Hope, 
(2002).  
7 Those are Davoodi and Zou, 1998, King and Ma, 2001, Jin and Zou, 2002, Neyapti, 2004, Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab, 2003 and Neyapti, 2004, 2005a and 2006.   
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(RD) is also associated with better income distribution in cases of good governance.  Since 
inflation, as a taxation device whose incidence falls disproportionately on lower income 
groups, is also likely to worsen income distribution, both of the latter two results may as well 
be interpreted as to indicate that RD can improve income equality.  Without the support of 
appropriate institutional structures
8, however, neither the evidence nor the current paper 
claims that FD would be effective in attaining fiscal discipline.  
In this paper, we model fiscal activity in such a way that local government units decide 
on their tax collection effort given a redistributive rule.  The basic features of the model are as 
follows. The redistributive rule is such that both “less than full tax collection effort” is 
punished and the deviation of income of each jurisdiction (or region) from a target level is 
compensated for.
10  Besides, the central government sets both a common tax rate to be 
implemented by localities and a proportion of tax revenues to be collected in a general pool, 
both of which help determine the size of the redistributable pool of revenues.  The local 
government choice of the optimal effort levels constitutes the procedure of fiscal 
decentralization (FD).   In the alternative fiscal procedure, the central government optimally 
chooses the level of transfers.   
The above outlined two alternative types of fiscal procedures (FD versus central 
government’s optimization) define the type of “fiscal institution” we propose in this paper.  
This set up enables us to investigate the implications of FD on fiscal discipline.  We 
                                                 
8 Here, the relevant institutions are local elections, central bank independence and governance 
measures.   
10 Redistributive rules are generally much simpler than this, especially in less developed countries.  In 
Turkey and many others, for example, transfers are distributed simply on “per capita” basis.  A 
redistributive scheme to eliminate horizontal imbalances with regards to various socio-economic 
indicators has been suggested in Neyapti (2005b).   
12 In current model fiscal burden can be measured by the extent of the lack of fiscal discipline.    
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demonstrate that under the proposed redistributive rule, FD indeed achieves higher fiscal 
discipline (greater tax collection effort) than the alternative procedure.  
One relevant question that arises here is what this model implies for fiscal-illusion (as 
in von Hagen-Harden, 1995): since local governments obtain benefit from spending in their 
own jurisdictions, one would expect that the implied size of redistribution under FD would 
exceed that of the central government’s.  Fiscal illusion, also referred to as the common pool 
problem, arises since localities internalize only a part of the fiscal burden while they get the 
whole benefit of spending.
12  In the current model, fiscal illusion can be said to occur if FD 
leads to lower fiscal discipline.  Since the punishment mechanism in the redistributive rule 
acts as a device to internalize the burden, FD may not necessarily be associated with fiscal 
illusion outcome, however.   
Different from the current set-up, the existing studies that investigate the redistributive 
role of the government focus on the optimal tax literature that emphasizes equalization of 
marginal cost of taxation across different tax sources.  Boadway, et al. (2001), for example, 
examine the relationship between FD and equalization via redistribution with a focus on 
migration across regions.  The authors obtain optimal decentralization outcomes from 
different strategic interactions between the central and regional governments and the private 
agents, where migration leads to externalities across regions.   
Also motivated by the question of the relationship between FD and fiscal discipline, 
Sanguinetti and Tomassi (ST, 2004) use a game theoretic framework to investigate the impact 
of FD on reducing asymmetric shocks across regions, against which transfers are viewed as 
insurance.  In ST, regions only differ in ex-post shocks, and transfers are decided either under 
a rule-based or discretionary schemes, under the latter of which the common pool problem is 
observed.  Their model differs from the current one in terms of mechanisms of transfer  
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decision, and thus leads to different implications regarding fiscal discipline than the current 
one.   
Different from the above studies, the current paper investigates the effect of a pre-
announced redistributive mechanism, given a revenue collection capacity, for achieving fiscal 
discipline.  With this objective, we focus exclusively on the analysis of local versus central 
government optimization problems, with a specific attention on their implications for fiscal 
discipline (ie. total tax collection effort and the size of transfers).
13   
Utilizing simulation analysis, the model indicates that the case of FD is associated with 
both a greater size of redistribution and higher fiscal discipline, measured in aggregate tax 
effort.  Although the fiscal discipline implication of the transfer size is not sufficiently 
addressed in the current set up, FD as a fiscal institution appears to therefore dominate fiscal 
centralization with regards to fiscal discipline.    
Comparative static analysis also yields various policy implications.  The findings 
indicate that, under FD, increased tax rate lowers total transfers.  On the other hand, it 
increases the size of transfers in the case of CG’s optimization.  Average tax collection effort 
under FD increases with the number of localities, a result that seems to be in contradiction 
with fiscal illusion.   The results for FD also indicate, however, that total size of redistribution 
increases with the number of localities.   
The issue addressed by the current model is rich of potential extensions that call for 
further exploration. In one such extension, the government tries to equalize income levels 
across regions.  The policy implications of this investigation are that while increasing the 
share of the centralized revenue pool increases fiscal discipline, increasing tax rates has a 
reverse impact.   
                                                 
13 The comparison of central and local government decisions is similarly done in both Boadway at al 
(2001) and ST.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Part 2, we present the basic features of 
the model.  Part 3 reports the redistributive outcomes of the different fiscal procedures in a 
comparative way, where the model is simulated.  Part 4 concludes.  
 
2. The  Model 
This paper assumes that the tax rate (t) is given exogenously by the central 
government.  For purposes of simplicity, we assume that there is one type of tax: that on 
income, which is exogenously given by the endowments of productive factors in each region 
that are all subject to the same production function.
14  Taxes are collected by the local 
governments whose tax collection efforts vary across localities.
15  Each local government i 
has an effective tax rate (ti) which is the product of their effort (Ai) and t (i.e.  ti = t.Ai).  The 
portion (1-c) of these revenues is spent by the local government, constituting its expenditures 
(Gi), while a “c” proportion is sent to the common revenue pool.  In addition, local 
governments spend what is transferred back to them (TRi) by the central government 
according to the announced rule of redistribution.  Local government spending is the only 
form of government spending in a locality.  The government spending in region i is therefore:  
Gi = (1- c)tiYi + TRi 
where Yi is the local income produced, and; the level of private spending Ci is given by:  
                                                 
14 Here, we assume that the levels, not the relative magnitudes of productive factors may vary across 
regions, indicating different output levels.  A natural extension of this model is to introduce 
heterogeneity across regions in terms of output variability across regions and over time, by allowing 
not only the level of factor endowments across regions, but also their relative magnitudes to vary, 
suggesting different product types across regions, such as agricultural and industrial, an issue to be 
further explained later. 
15 While income–tax is generally centrally collected, unless perhaps in federal systems, the local 
government’s optimization decision regarding the tax collection effort can be justified on a couple of 
grounds: first, by helping monitor the economic activity subject to tax collection, local governments 
can be rewarded via some pre-announced incentive mechanisms, as this model proposes.  Second, 
local government’s effort to collect income tax entails eliminating unrecorded economic activity and 
tax evasion, which helps improve the collection of other local taxes that are assumed away in this 
model for the purpose of simplicity.     
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Ci =(1- ti)Yi   
16 
The total size of the transfers (TR) made by the central government is the sum of revenues 
collected in the common pool: TR = cΣ tiYi, as other forms of financing do not exist.    
  Given these basic features, the local and central government problems are presented in 
Parts 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. 
 
2.1    Local Governments’ Problem:  The Case of Fiscal Decentralization 
The procedure of FD is identified by an optimization problem where local government 
(LG) maximizes its utility subject to a redistribution rule.  Hence, LG chooses the level of tax 
collection effort Ai  (where 0<Ai ≤1 since if Ai=0, there would be no redistribution).
17   
For purposes of tractability, we use a Cobb-Douglass type of utility in a log-linear 
form defined over both private and public consumption:  
i A Max     α ln Ci + β ln Gi  ; where  i = 1…n                (1) 
subject to   TRi = k t Yi (Ai -1) + m (Yi
*- Yi)      ( 2 )  
where i denotes each of the n local governmental units (regions) and Ci , Gi , TRi , Yi and Yi
* 
are all expressed in per capita terms.   α and β are parameters representing the relative weights 
of private and government spending in utility (such that  α+β =1).
19 Equation (2) is the 
redistribution rule that determines the amount of transfer locality i receives.   Yi
* is some 
exogenously given target of Yi.
20  k and m are the parameters that indicate the extent the 
                                                 
16 For the whole economy ΣYi =Σ(Ci+Gi), given that total transfers are equal to common pool of 
revenues.  For a given locality, Yi = Ci+Gi+ “net transfers”, where “net transfers” are given by: (TRi - 
ctiYi). 
17 Alternatively, one can think of a case where each local government takes as burden 1/n share of 
overall size of redistribution (∑ i TR ).  This case can be analyzed by adding the burden (with the 
negative sign) to the objective functions.  The solution of this problem, however, turns out to be rather 
complicated , however, whose results are therefore not currently available. 
19 We will separately investigate the case of (α+β)>1. 
20 We take the total of income deviations from target levels to be negative so that there will be some 
redistribution for the purpose of income compensation, even if all regions spend full tax effort.  This 
target level can be thought of as the average income.  However, when explicitly modeled, this leads to  
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government punishes less than full tax collection effort (Ai -1), and compensate income 
deviation from a target, respectively.   
The solution of the LG problem is obtained as: 
  Ai = 
* () ( () )
() ( 1 )
iii
i




−− + − + +
+− +
                                     (3) 
which yields the optimal total transfers (TR) of: 
*
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2.2 Central  Government’s  Problem: 
  The central government (CG) is assumed to be benevolent and chooses the level of 
transfers that maximizes the overall welfare of the society subject to the constraint, which 
indicates that transfers are equal to the revenues collected in the common pool
21:  




[α ln Ci + β ln Gi ]      (5) 








AiYi      ( 6 )  
The solution to the problem is:     




 (Ai Yi) - (1-c)t AiYi                          (7) 
which implies that redistribution is made in such a way that local government spending in 
each locality is equal to the average effective tax revenue across the regions. 
Based on the above solutions, we next provide the comparative statics of TR and TRi’s 
for each of the above procedures, and of Ai’s for the FD procedure.  We then simulate the 
                                                                                                                                                         
the result of non-positive total transfers, which we do not desire to obtain in the current model that is 
set up to investigate the problem of redistribution. 
21 This way, this paper chooses not to address the financing issue, which is planned to be one of the 
future extensions of the current model.  
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comparative static results for n = 2, given α, β, k, m, t, c Yi and 
*
i Y  (where i=1,2) that we set at 
some reasonable levels or intervals.  This enables us to investigate the differences resulting 
from the two procedures.  Part 3 reports these results. 
 
3. Implications 
In order to derive policy implications regarding the fiscal institutions defined in the 
current study, we perform a comparative static analysis.  Since the signs of some of the 
derivatives can not be explicitly obtained for many model parameters, we also perform a 
simulation analysis.  Next, we compare the total optimal tax collection efforts resulting from 
LG and the CG problems.  Likewise, we compare the two fiscal procedures with regards to 
the implied sizes of redistribution.  Section 3.1 first reports the unambiguous results of the 
comparative statics and in subsection 3.1.1 the simulation results for ambiguous results are 
reported.  Section 3.2 compares the redistributive and disciplining aspects of the two 
procedures.  
3.1. Comparative  Statics 
This section reports the partial derivatives of the individual and total transfers obtained  
as solutions to the two alternative fiscal procedures, and of the optimal efforts resulting from 
the FD procedure.  Only some of these partial derivatives are unambigous, however, 
necessitating a simulation analysis for the interpretation of the ambiguous results, which are 
reported in subsection 3.1.1.  Appendix 1 reports all the comparative statics results.   
The results are mostly expected: in case of central governments’ optimization, we 
observe that c, t, Ai and Yi all have positive effects on total transfers.
22  In addition, the LG 
                                                 
22 Note, however, that  ∂TRi /∂Ai < 0 when  (1/n) < (1-c), which is generally the case.  This result 
derives from the fact that when the tax collection effort of a locality increases, local tax revenue 
component of Gi increases, which is then balanced with reduced transfers to equate local public 
spending across localities.  
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problem yields an interesting result regarding the effect of income deviation on the level of 
effort and transfers, where the sign of the first is negative and the second is positive.  All the 
remaining partial effects are ambiguous, and thus are not reported. 
 
Proposition 1:  In the procedure of fiscal decentralization, an increase in the deviation of 
actual output from its target generates a disincentive for a locality to spend tax effort because 
the deviation increases transfers due to the income compensation component of the 
redistribution rule. 
 
Proposition 2:  Under FD, average tax effort increases with an increase in the number of 
localities.  This is likely to be due to an increased number of localities competing for the pool 
of tax revenues.  Hence, under the current redistributive mechanism, FD leads to greater fiscal 
discipline the greater the value of n, indicating that FD is likely to be more efficient in case of 
large countries, a finding that is empirically supported (Neyapti, 2006).   
 
3.1.1  Simulation Results for Comparative Statics: 
Since the partial derivatives of the optimization problems mostly yield ambiguous 
results, we perform a simulation analysis by assigning the following range of values for the 
model parameters
23, as well as to Y1, Y2, 
*
1 Y and 
*
2 Y : 
                                                 
23 For the choice of t, related statistics and analytical studies provide some basis:  in a study of 
marginal income taxes, Easterly and Rebelo (1992) report that (income weighted) the rate range from 
as low as 0.01 (for example, Argentina, Guatemala) to 0.37 (Ireland) in the sample they considered.  
The “effective” tax rate, however, is lower due to exemptions, deductions and tax evasion.  The 
effective tax rates (on labor and capital) calculated for a list of developed countries (Mendoza et al, 
1994) ranged between 0.25 and 0.50 during the 1990s.  Mendoza et al (1994) also report that the 
average tax rates are also similar for the G-7.  Wolff (2005) extend the sample of Mendoza et al. to 
EU-25 and report lower effective capital taxes, which average less than 0.2, than labor tax, which 
average between 0.4 to 0.5.  On the other hand, tax to GDP ratios to express the “overall tax burden” 
in the economy (as suggested by Wolff, 2005) and the average ratio is 0.11 for the less developed 
countries and 0.15 for the developed countries in the past decade.  However, “overall tax burden” is  
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α = 0.7;     β = 0.3;    c = 0.1;      t Є[0.1 , 0.5];    Ai Є(0 , 1]; 
Y1 Є[100 , 500];     
*
1 Y Є[1.01 xY1 , 1.1 xY1];    Y2 Є[1,000 , 30,000];    
*
2 Y Є[1.01 xY2  , 1.1 xY2]    
 
We set the target levels of incomes such that the total of targeted output exceeds the 
total of actual output levels.  This way we ensure that there exists some redistribution for 
purposes of income compensation (i.e. TR >0).  These income levels can be thought of as in 
per capita Dollar terms.  Justifications for α =0.7 and β = 0.3 can be provided based on the 
average shares of state versus private sector in the economy.  For c, we took the approximate 
figure for Turkey.   
In addition to the above values, the values of k and m, which are crucial for policy 
purposes, are needed.  We obtain k and m as optimal solutions to an alternative CG problem 
where the central government chooses them to maximize its objective function.  This problem 
is reported in Appendix 2.  The LGs are informed about the redistributive rule and perform 
their optimization accordingly.  
  The partial derivatives obtained though simulations
24 indicate that tax efforts are 
negatively affected by α, m and the deviation of own income from the target, while they are 
positively related with β, k and c.  The signs of the derivatives can be explained as follows.   
The higher the utility weight given to private consumption, which is equal to the after tax 
income, the lower is the tax effort that negatively affects the after tax income.  By contrast, 
the weight on public spending, which includes transfers, is positively related with the optimal 
tax effort.  In addition, we observe that, for a given level of transfers, an increase in c implies 
higher tax effort, reflecting localities’ competition for a larger collected pool of revenues.  
The higher is the deviation of income from the target, the greater are the transfers for purposes 
of income compensation, which reduces the incentive for tax collection effort. Likewise, the 
                                                                                                                                                         
only a very crude measure of average tax rate.  Hence, for LDCs, as well as for the world average, we 
take t to be:  0.1<t<0.5.  
24 The number of data points generated is 40,493.  
  13
greater the income compensation parameter, the lower is optimal effort.  On the other hand, 
the higher the punishment parameter, the higher is the optimal effort, indicating that the 
proposed fiscal rule fulfils its institutional role of inducing greater fiscal discipline.     
The sign of the derivative of TR with respect to t is observed to be the opposite of the  
CG problem; FD leads to lower total transfers when tax rate is higher.  In addition, the higher 
the weight on income compensation (m), the higher are total transfers, even though m has a 
negative effect on the effort level.  Indeed, because higher m results in higher TR, the model 
yields the lower tax effort reported earlier.
 The sign of the partials of TRi  (for i=1 and 2) are 
the same as those for TR.  One exception is that only low income locality gets higher transfers 
in case of higher c, which is the same finding as in the CG problem
25. 
 
Proposition 3:  In the case of FD, higher tax rate (t) leads to lower size of redistribution.  
This finding is in support of the (falling portion of) the Laffer curve.  This observation may be 
linked with the positive association of the optimal m with the tax rate (see Appendix 2): as t 
increases, since the optimal income compensation parameter increases with it, this may 
induce lower incentives on tax collection effort.   
 
Proposition 4:   An increase in the number of localities (n) increases the total size of 
redistribution for the case of FD, a result that is consistent with the fiscal illusion concept in 
case this implies additional financing.   
 
3.2   Redistribution and Fiscal Discipline : Comparing the two procedures 
In view of the foregoing problems, we can now investigate the relationship between 
FD and fiscal discipline, given the suggested redistributive mechanism.  To compare the total 
                                                 
25  Simulations are also performed for the solution of the CG problem, based on 139,298 data points.  
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level of tax effort implied by the two problems, we first assume that CG pre-announces the 
redistribution rule.  The optimal values of k and m, which are found as the solution of the CG 
problem stated in 3.1.1. , are simulated given the level of effort ranging between 0 (exclusive) 
and 1 (inclusive).   These values are then used to simulate the optimal solution for Ai resulting 
from the FD procedure.  Next, we compare these values to those in the CG problem that are 
initially used to generate the corresponding optimal k and m values.  Simulations yield the 
following ordering for total effort levels and size of redistribution, respectively:
    
∑i LG i A ,  >  ∑i CG i A ,  
∑i LG i TR ,  >  ∑i CG i TR ,   
where LG and CG subscripts stand for the outcome of the LG  and CG problems, 
respectively.   
 
Proposition 5:  FD leads to greater fiscal discipline in terms of higher total tax collection 
effort.  It also leads to greater size of redistribution, whose implication for fiscal discipline is 
subject to further investigation.
26  
 
4.  Extension:  The case of Equalization 
  Improved income distribution is one of the main objectives of governments’ 
redistributive efforts.  This section explores the role of the two fiscal procedures in improving 
income distribution across regions.  To this end, we perform simulations to investigate the 
implications of the LG and CG problems in case incomes of the localities are targeted to be 
the same.  We thus modify our model parameters such that the levels of income are now 
closer in ranges and income targets are the same:  
                                                 
26 One way of investigating this implication is to incorporate into the LG problem the size of 
redistribution, such that each LG will get a share of total transfers as the burden.  The rationale for this 
is that TR may lead to inflationary financing.   
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t Є [0.1 , 0.5];     Y1 Є[100 , 1000] ;    Y2 Є[2,000 , 10,000];     
*
i Y Є[1.01 xY2 , 1.1 xY2] 
 
Based on 57,460 data points generated, the comparative statics of the CG problem 
yield the same signs as for the above case, which strengthens the findings of the study 
reported above.  In additon, however, we observe that setting equal targets imply that transfers 
to the higher income locality is now unambiguously negatively related with the tax rate and 
the own effort level.    
  In case of the LG problem, we observe the following based on simulations using 20, 
821 data points.   As different from the above case, the case of equalization implies that the 
level of effort increases in c and decreases in t only the high income locality.  Compared with 
the earlier results, this indicates that while the effect of c on low income region disappears, t 
becomes a factor that negatively influences the optimal effort in the rich region.  In a study of 
German fiscal system, Von Hagen (2000) provides empirical support for this finding by 
stating that equalization has led to adverse incentives for tax collection.   
We further observe that the only difference in the comparative statics of transfers, as 
compared to the results of the earlier section, is that it is the rich region, instead of the poor 
region, whose transfers increase with c, thorough its impact on optimal effort level.  The 
remaining of the signs reported in the foregoing section are further confirmed by these 
simulations.   
 
Proposition 6: Setting equal income targets (equalization) can render centralization of tax 
revenues, i.e. increasing c, more effective; but higher taxes less effective, where effectiveness 





This paper presents a model to analyze the implications of fiscal decentralization for 
fiscal discipline.  We measure fiscal discipline via total tax collection effort.  The model 
evaluates the relative outcome of fiscal decentralization by comparing the solution of the local 
government problem to that of the central government.  The transfer mechanism considered 
has an income compensation and punishment components, the latter of which particularly 
enables us to address the fiscal discipline aspect of redistribution.   
The evaluation of the model solutions indicates that i. fiscal decentralization leads to  
an increase in transfers in response to an increase in the deviation of actual output from its 
target, which in turn reduces local tax effort.   ii. FD appears to have a disciplining effect as it 
implies higher total tax collection effort than in the case of the CG problem.  iii.  FD is also 
associated with greater size of redistribution.  iv. The suggested redistributive rule leads to a 
positive association between the average tax effort and the number of localities for the case of 
FD, which runs in contrast to the predictions of fiscal illusion,.   On the other hand, increasing 
number of localities increases the total size of redistribution in the case of FD.  v.  The greater 
the rate of taxation, the lower the size of redistribution in the case of FD.  This occurs due to 
the reduced incentives for local governments to increase the tax collection effort.  
In an extension of the model, we investigate the case of choosing equal income targets 
for the regions.  As different from the original model, this modification leads lower fiscal 
discipline in higher income regions in response to a tax increase.  Centralization of revenues 
appears to be a better alternative to increase fiscal discipline in this case. 
Various extensions of the paper are still in order: first, we will modify the optimization 
problem of the LGs to incorporate the “fiscal burden”, which is in the form of a disutility 
derived from the share of the total size of redistribution accruing to an individual LG.  Fiscal 
burden can be thought of as additional financial requirement in this setup.  Further  
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modifications of the model will be in the form of i. endogenizing the local output to 
government spending and thus to local tax collection effort; ii. introducing heterogeneity 
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Appendix 1:   Comparative Statics Results 
 
a)  Comparative statics for the unambiguous results (for  i=1,2) 
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b)  Simulation of the Ambiguous Comparative Statics Results (for the LG problem): 
∂
o
i A /∂α <0;   ∂
o
i A /∂β >0;   ∂
o
i A /∂k ≥0;   ∂
o
i A /∂m ≤0; ∂
o




i Y - i Y ) ≤0  
∂TR/∂α<0;    ∂TR/∂β>0;   ∂TR/∂m>0 ;  ∂TR/∂(
*
i Y - i Y )>0 ;   ∂TR/∂t<0  ; ∂TR/∂n>0  
The same results are obtained for individual transfers: TRi.  In addition, ∂TR1/∂c ≥0. 
 
The results can be summarized as follows: (for i=1,2)  
 
 
Table 1:   Comparative Statics of TR, TRi and Ai with respect to model parameters and  
                 variables reported columnwise. 
 
  α  β  c   m   k  t   n  Yi*-Yi  Ai 
LG PROBLEM                 
TR  -  + +  + - - + + na 
A1  - +  +  -  +  -  na  -  na 
A2  - +  +  -  +  -  na  -  na 
                 
CG PROBLEM                 
TR  na na +  na na + - na  + 
TR1  na na +  na na na  -  na na 
TR2  na na +  na na na na na  na 
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Appendix 2:   Optimal choice of k and m  
                                                     
The parameters k and m are determined optimally by the CG as a solution to the 
problem where the CG maximizes the sum of utilities of all the localities subject to the 
condition that the total pool of revenues (i.e. ctΣAiYi) is equal to the total transfers that is now 
expressed via the redistributive rule: 
           
 
 
This optimization problem is solved for k and m, for given effort levels for the two 
localities.
27  The resulting TR is the same as the one obtained under the CG problem reported 
in Section 2.2. 
 
                                                 
27 The calibration results for the signs of the comparative statics of the optimal levels of k and m are 
observed as follows.  Parameter c affects k one to one, while its effect on m is always positive; the 
optimal income compensation parameter increases with both c and t.  Optimal values of both k and m 
decreases with the effort of a locality with relatively smaller income.  While the impact of the effort of 
a larger income locality is positive on the optimal punishment parameter, its impact on m is 
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